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ABstrACt
In this paper I argue that the symmetric approach to moral 
responsibility, proposed by John Martin Fischer, should 
be focused merely on the consequence-particular.  Fischer 
employs the symmetric approach with the intention to 
solve the asymmetric problems on moral responsibility. 
The problem arises from Frankfurt’s case, which rejects 
the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), and relies on 
the action, rather than omission resulting in asymmetric 
problems. Fischer solves the problem by using his guidance 
control and returns the symmetry the idea of moral 
responsibility. I am convinced by his idea of guidance 
control that moral responsibility for an omission is the same 
as moral responsibility for an action. Notwithstanding, 
I found that Fischer appears to broaden his conclusion from 
the consequence-particular to the consequence-universal. 
This issue becomes more explicit when he argues against the 
case of “direct argument”. But I contend that this argument 
is unnecessary. The attempt to stretch out responsibility 
to the consequence-universal is only designed to address 
a certain kind of problem in his moral responsibility’s 
theory. This can also be seen when Fischer tries to solve 
other problem by using his overdetermination example. 
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I believe that his theory of moral responsibility and guidance 
control should limit itself merely to the consequence-
particular.
introduction
In order to develop my argument, I will clarify some relevant terms. 
I will start by briefly explaining the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, 
which is repudiated by Harry G. Frankfurt. I will then go on to explain 
Fischer’s Theory of Moral Responsibility and his concept of “guidance 
control.” After that I will demonstrate that even if the Principle of Alternate 
Possibilities is rejected, there are by all accounts some complications with 
the cases of non-action or omission. Although moral responsibility for an 
action does not require the ability to do otherwise, moral responsibility 
by omission does seems to require the ability to do the action in question. 
At this point, I will show how Fischer employs his concept of guidance 
control to solve the problem and restore symmetry to Frankfurt’s rejection 
of alternate possibilities. I will then raise my concerns on his use of the 
consequence universal, and I will argue that Fischer’s approach to moral 
responsibility should limit itself to the consequence-particular. I will 
conclude by giving suggestions on how to more properly use Fischer’s 
theory of moral responsibility.
section 1: frankfurt’s type example
Often it seems that when we are making a decision, we are 
standing on a forking path. A path that indicates our freedom to choose 
whether to do right or wrong action. This leads us to judge somebody to 
be praiseworthy or blameworthy for his actions because we believe that 
he could have chosen differently or could have done otherwise. 
Harry G. Frankfurt named the principle as “The Principle of 
Alternate Possibilities” or PAP for short. PAP states that a person is 
morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done 
otherwise.1 However, Frankfurt shows problems with this principle. 
He contends that a person is morally responsible for what he has done 
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even though he could not have done otherwise. Frankfurt provides a novel 
example to illustrate his view. This has become known as a “Frankfurt-
type Example” or “Frankfurt-case”. For the purpose of this paper, I have 
created my own version of Frankfurt-type example:
Jack and John hates their friend, Lina, who has borrowed 
money from them but never returned it. Jack therefore 
decides to kill Lina at a specific time. John agrees with his 
friend’s decision. However, he believes that Jack might not 
go through with his plan for he loved Lina in the past. So 
John secretly implants a device into Jack’s brain to ensure 
that if Jack had shown any sign of hesitation, the device 
would intervene in his thinking process and make Jack kill 
Lina anyway. But as it turns out, Jack kills Lina without 
showing any sign of hesitation. Thus, the implanted device 
did not do anything. 
Following this case, we can see that moral responsibility is not 
dependent solely on the capacity to do something else. Jack is ethically 
in charge of his act of killing Lina, despite the fact that he could not have 
ceased from his plan. 
After Frankfurt published his paper in 1969, numerous literature 
emerged in reaction to this. Criticisms of his idea came in two forms. There 
are those who rejected it on the basis of preserving PAP or maintaining 
that the ability to act otherwise as a requirement for moral responsibility. 
They employ either the flicker of freedom strategy or the omission strategy. 
Another is a group of philosophers who insisted that if causal determinism 
is true, then it rules out moral responsibility directly. The prominent 
principle of this group is the Principle of Transfer Non-Responsibility. 
I will now clarify both approaches. 
section 2: fischer’s theory of moral responsibility
The most prominent proponent of the Frankfurt example is John 
Martin Fischer.2 He addresses Frankfurt’s case in his approach called 
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Semicompatibilism. Semicompatibilism claims that moral responsibility is 
compatible with causal determinism, despite the fact causal determinism 
rules out the ability to do otherwise. Fischer distinguishes two sorts of 
control: regulative control and guidance control. Regulative control is 
freedom in the sense of the agent having the ability to do otherwise. 
Guidance control is freedom in a sense of the agent having control over 
his own behavior. Fischer claims that guidance control is a freedom 
relevant to moral responsibility, not regulative control.2
One might ask on what condition we could establish our moral 
responsibility if we could not have done otherwise? Fischer answers this 
question by insisting that our action should be a result of guidance control 
issuing directly from the moderate reason-responsiveness mechanism and 
this mechanism needs to belong to the agent himself.4 
There are two approaches for moral responsibility: the hierarchical 
and non-hierarchical approach. The well-known hierarchical approach is 
developed by Frankfurt. This approach sees desire functioning at many 
levels. Desire at one level can conflict with desires in another level. For 
instance, there are two orders of desire: the first order and the second 
order. One might have a first-order desire to eat candy. The same person 
also has the second-order desire not to eat the candy. Moral responsibility 
comes from the ability of the agent to identify himself with the second-
order desire through the use of reason.5
While the hierarchical approach requires moral responsibility to 
emerge from these various levels of desire, the non-hierarchical approach 
does not. It requires association between the agent and the value (or 
reason). The non-hierarchical model can be divided into two sorts: agent-
based and mechanism-based theory. The agent-based theory requires the 
agent to be responsive to reasons, where the mechanism-based theory 
requires the mechanism on which the agent acts to be responsive to 
reasons. Fischer’s approach to moral responsibility can be classified as 
mechanism-based reasons-responsiveness. In his version, he distinguishes 
“strong” and “weak” versions of the theory. Fischer describes that the 
strong reasons-responsiveness would be obtained when: 
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A certain kind K of mechanism actually issues in an action 
and if there were sufficient reason to do otherwise and K 
were to operate, the agent would recognize the sufficient 
reason and thus choose to do otherwise and do otherwise.6
 
In other words, the agent must acknowledge a sufficient reason 
to do, or choose, in accordance with reason, and act in accordance with 
the choice to complete the condition of strong reason-responsiveness. 
This approach has problems when dealing with the scenarios involving 
weakness of will. For instance, I acknowledged that eating candy is bad 
for my health. Nevertheless, I decide to eat the candy anyway. Does it 
mean that I am not responsible for my action of eating candy? Obviously 
not. Thus, the condition for strong-responsiveness may be too strong to 
satisfy all of three conditions. Failing one of the three conditions does 
not mean that I am not responsible for my action. 
Consequently, there is a looser version of reasons responsiveness 
which is described by Fischer: 
Weak reasons-responsiveness, which requires only that 
there be some possible scenario in which the actual 
mechanism operates, the agent has reason to do otherwise, 
and he does otherwise.7
 
From this definition, any kind of reason to do otherwise, and 
the agent doing otherwise, easily fulfills the condition of this weak 
reason-responsiveness. Note that the reason to do otherwise need not 
be a sufficient reason. It could be any kind of reason. Thus, we face the 
problem of the theory being either too strong or too weak for the reasons-
responsive mechanism. 
Fischer suggests a third approach for the mechanism called 
“moderate reasons-responsiveness” to solve the problem of the model 
being too strong or too weak.  Here I present a clear definition of moderate 
reasons-responsiveness given by Todd R. Long.8 
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An agent’s responsibility-relevant mechanism K is moderately 
reasons-responsive if 
(1) K is regularly receptive to reasons, some of which are moral; 
this requires (a) that holding fixed the operation of a K-type 
mechanism, the agent would recognize reasons in such a way 
as to give rise to an understandable pattern from the viewpoint 
of a third party who understands the agent’s values and beliefs; 
and (b) that some of the reasons mentioned in (1.a) are moral 
reasons; and 
(2) K is at least weakly reactive to reasons; this requires that 
the agent would react to at least one sufficient reason to do 
otherwise (in some possible scenario), although it does not 
follow that the agent could have responded differently to the 
actual reasons; and 
(3) K is the agent’s own; being the agent’s own means “taking 
responsibility” for K; this requires that the agent (a) sees 
herself as the source of her behavior (which follows from the 
operation of K); and (b) believes that she is an apt candidate 
for the reactive attitudes as a result of how she exercises her 
agency in certain contexts; and (c) views herself as an agent 
with respect to (3.a) - (3.b) based on her evidence for these 
beliefs. 
There are two crucial components for the moderate reasons-
responsiveness mechanism, which are: reasons-recognition and 
reasons-reactivity. Reasons-recognition means the ability to recognize 
the reasons that exist. Reasons-reactivity means choose in accordance 
with reasons that are recognized as good and sufficient.
Fischer contends that merely have the guidance control which 
is connected to the moderate-reason responsiveness is insufficient to 
be considered as a control for moral responsibility. He suggests that 
the guidance control must contain two elements: reasons-sensitivity of 
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the appropriate sort and the mechanism-ownership. The condition of 
mechanism-ownership could address such problems as brainwashing. By 
the mechanism-ownership, Fischer also argues by using the subjective 
approach. He insists that the agent, in some senses, needs to see himself 
in a certain way.9
Fischer’s theory of moral responsibility usually is challenged in 
two ways: by indirect and direct argument. The indirect argument argues 
against semicompatibilism based on the desire to preserve the alternative 
possibilities. The direct argument contends that moral responsibility 
is ruled out straightforwardly by causal determinism regardless of the 
alternative possibilities. I will briefly clarify eight possible cases of 
the indirect argument and exhibit how Fischer handles those cases. 
Therefore, I will introduce two notions: The consequence-particular and 
the consequence-universal, which are my main concern of this paper. 
Fischer and Ravizza provide a clear explanation of this distinction:
Consequences can be construed as either particulars or 
universals. This distinction is made in terms of criteria of 
individuation: the causal antecedents of a consequence-
particular are essential to it, while there can be various 
different causal routes to the same consequence-universal. 
(Fischer and Ravizza 1998: 244)
The following table represents my analysis of both action and 
omission case for the Frankfurt-type example. I will call this table for 
a balanced analysis. There is no middle ground in which agent is not 
responsible for anything by this analysis.
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no. Case to do Counter-
factual
Consequence 
-particular
Consequence 
-universal
morally 
responsible
1 Action Good Good Good Good Praiseworthy
2 Action Good Good Good Bad Praiseworthy
3 Action Bad Bad Bad Good Blameworthy
4 Action Bad Bad Bad Bad Blameworthy
5 Omission Good (omit) 
Good
(omit) Good Good Blameworthy
6 Omission Good (omit) 
Good
(omit) Good Bad Blameworthy
7 Omission Bad (omit) Bad (omit) Bad Good Praiseworthy
8 Omission Bad (omit) Bad (omit) Bad Bad Praiseworthy
Case 1 and 2 are counterparts to case 7 and 8, as well as case 3 and 4 are 
counterparts to case 5 and 6 respectively.  The “To do” and “Counter-Factual” 
column will always be the same to guarantee that the agent has no 
alternative possibilities. The consequence-particular can be interpreted 
as an action directly issuing from the moderate reason-responsiveness 
mechanism. Thus, by this analysis, there is no case in which the agent does 
not deliberate his or her ability to do or to omit the action.  The only one 
column which is possible to be different from “To do”, “Counterfactual” 
and the “Consequence-particular” is the “Consequence-universal”.  This 
is because the consequence-universal might be obtained from a totally 
different causal chain as in the overdetermination case.10
To answer the question of what we actually hold a person to be 
morally responsible for, let me explain case by case from case 1 to 8. 
I will use the “Hero” case, which Fischer mentions in his work “My Way” 
as an example for case 1 and 2: 
In “Hero,” Matthew is walking along a beach, looking at 
the water. He sees a child struggling in the water, and he 
quickly deliberates about the matter, jumps into the water, 
and rescues the child. We can imagine that Matthew does 
not give any thought to not trying to rescue the child, 
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but that if he had considered not trying to save the child, 
he would have been overwhelmed by literally irresistible 
guilt feelings that would have caused him to jump into the 
water and save the child anyway.10
Matthew is praiseworthy for his action, even though he could not 
have done otherwise. The “irresistible guilt” acts as a counter factual 
intervener in the alternative scenario. The consequence-particular is that 
he saves the child. The consequence-universal is the child is saved by 
him. This is case 1 of my analysis. However, if the child is not saved 
by Matthew, but is killed by a shark or simply drowns regardless of 
Matthew’s action, it will turn case 1 into case 2. Also, the fact that the 
child is dead from the other causal chain should not turn the case of 
Matthew’s praiseworthy action into blameworthy or even neutral one. 
He is praiseworthy because of his action which is issuing directly from 
his moderate reason-responsiveness mechanism. 
Case 3 and 4 can be considered by using the case of normal 
Frankfurt’s example. Using the case at the beginning of this paper “Jack 
kills Lina without showing any sign of hesitation”, I assume that Jack is 
morally responsible for his action, even though he could not have done 
otherwise. In addition, if he had tried to kill Lina, but failed because 
someone saved her, he would still be responsible for trying to kill Lina. 
For case 5 and 6 suppose that: 
John is walking along a beach, and he sees a child struggling 
in the water. John believes that he could save the child with 
very little effort, but he is disinclined to expend any energy 
to help anyone else. He decides not to try to save the child, 
and he continues to walk along the beach. Is John morally 
responsible for failing to save the child? Unknown to John, 
the child was about to drown when John glimpsed him, 
and the child drowned one second after John decided not 
to jump into the water.12
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In this case, the fact that the child is about to drown is not 
a counterfactual as we would see in Frankfurt’s example, which would 
be considered counterfactual within the agent deliberation process. The 
consequence-universal that the child is about to drown is the fact from 
the different causal determinism. However, Frankfurt himself recognized 
such a problem and suggested a modified case using guilt to direct the 
agent to doing something else rather than saving the child. Nevertheless, 
I would insist that John is morally responsible for the fact that he did 
not try to save the child. He omitted saving the child. Even though the 
child is not dead and saved by someone else, he is still responsible for 
not trying to do what he believes he could do. 
For the case of omission to do a dreadful thing 7 and 8 using Fischer’s 
example:
Imagine that you are a small-time thug strolling along 
a dimly lit street in a deserted part of town. Suddenly, you 
spy a shiny, new Mercedes with a flat tire stranded by the 
side of the road. The driver of the car is a well-dressed, 
elderly gentleman with a bulging billfold in his breast 
pocket. You are tempted to hurry over to the car, assault 
the old man, and steal his money. Fortunately, you decide 
against this, and you continue along your way. Are you 
morally responsible for failing to rob the driver? Well, 
unknown to you (and the driver of the car), the Mafia has 
put drugs into the trunk of the car. Five Mafioso thugs are 
watching the car from five other cars in the neighborhood. 
They have strict instructions: if anyone threatens the driver 
of the car, they are to shoot that person with their Uzis. In 
these circumstances, we can safely imagine that, if you had 
attempted to rob the driver, you would have been killed.13
Fischer explains this case of omission to do a terrible thing as 
the agent is responsible for that fact that he did not try to rob someone 
(this is considered praiseworthy action), even though according to the 
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consequence-universal, if he did, he would have been killed. I believe 
that we could entitle the agent to be morally responsible for action or 
omission solely on his or her action issuing directly from the mechanism.
But the problem emerges when Fischer construes the case of 
omission to be a simple omission and complex omission. The simple 
omission is the omission of the body’s movement. The complex 
omission involves both the act of omitting the body’s movement and the 
consequences. To find whether the agent is morally responsible, he gives 
the condition that:
It is natural to say that an agent has guidance control of 
his failure to do A (where this is a complex omission) just 
in case: (1) his movement of his body in a certain way is 
moderately responsive to reason, and (2) the relevant event 
in the external world is suitably sensitive to his failure to 
move his body in a different way.14
I do not agree with him on the second condition. The relevant event 
in the external world should not be counted as the condition to entitle the 
agent to be morally responsible. Consider the following: 
We contend that, when an agent’s omission is a complex 
omission, he should be construed as bringing about 
a relatively narrowly specified negative Consequence-
universal. So, for example, imagine that, in “Good Fortune,” 
John walks along a beach, sees a child struggling in the 
water, and simply decides to continue walking (and not to 
bother to try to save the child). Here, it seems (at first blush) 
that John brings about the negative consequence-universal, 
that the child is not saved (from drowning). But suppose 
that the child is saved from drowning by floating to a nearby 
island within a few seconds of John’s decision. John has 
failed to save the child, but he has not brought about the 
negative consequence-universal, that the child is not saved 
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(from drowning). What he does bring about, however, is 
that the child is not saved by him. And, in general, we 
contend that it is fruitful to construe complex omissions on 
this model, that is, as the agent’s bringing about relatively 
finely specific negative consequence-universals.15
This example is exactly the same as case 5, in which the agent 
omits doing something good but the consequence-universal yields as a 
good result. However, if the consequence-universal turns out to be a bad 
one, as the child drowning in case 6. This situation can be construed as 
the relevant event in the external world is suitably sensitive to agent’s 
body movement, thus he is responsible for the consequence-universal. 
But, why should consequences-universals that are not in the power of 
the agent be considered as the condition for someone to be responsible? 
The problem might not be clear at this point, but it will reveal itself on 
the direct argument, which I will now turn to explain. 
section 3: the direct Argument
As previously stated, the argument against Frankfurt and Fischer 
that moral responsibility is not compatible with determinism notably 
comes in two forms: alternative possibilities and direct argument. Now, 
I will turn to the Principle of Transfer Non-Responsibility (or Principle 
of Transfer NR). It can be roughly stated “if no one is responsible for p, 
and no one is responsible for the fact that p leads to q, then it follows that 
no one is responsible for q.”16 Thus, if causal determinism is true, then no 
one is even partly morally responsible for anything. These propositions 
rule out moral responsibility directly without paying attention to the 
alternative possibilities. 
Such a proposition seems to go well with the case of a natural disaster 
such as a tsunami. In that case, no one is partially responsible, the tsunami 
simply occurs. The reason is that there is no human agency in the case. 
Fischer response to such an argument seems to extend his conclusion more 
than warranted. Fischer responds to the argument by using an example that:
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Betty plants...explosives in the crevices of [a] glacier and 
[intuitively speaking, freely] detonates the charge at T1 
causing an avalanche that crushes the enemy fortress at 
T3 [a result intended by Betty]. Unbeknownst to Betty...
however, the glacier is gradually melting, shifting, and 
eroding. Had Betty not placed the dynamite in the crevices, 
some ice and rocks would have broken free at T2, starting 
a natural avalanche that would have crushed the enemy 
camp at T3.
This example could be simply summarized that Betty did nothing 
that the glacier would not have one naturally. Betty entered into the causal 
chain sharing the consequence-universal with the natural disaster. This 
is the case of overdetermination. Betty seems to be morally responsible 
for her action because her action of planting the device issues from her 
moderate reasons-responsiveness. 
Mckenna argues that Fischer still hangs criticism of the Principle 
of Transfer NR. This is because Fischer uses his ‘two-path’ case to solve 
the problem itself, not the ‘one-path’. The Principle of Transfer NR 
is designed to rule out the moral responsibility within the chain directly and 
is ‘one-path’. This is the reason why it is called a direct argument. If Fischer 
cannot employ one-path example rather than the overdetermination one, 
it might imply that moral responsibility could be ruled out directly by 
causal determinism. Nevertheless, Mckenna granted that the Transfer NR 
cannot rule out causal overdetermination.17 This gives chance for Fischer to 
argue that, “To point out that Transfer NR poses problems for developing 
a plausible compatibilist theory of moral responsibility is one thing; to 
suppose that it generates a successful argument for incompatibilist is quite 
another”. According to Fischer, even if the Principle NR could reject the 
compatibility between causal determinism and moral responsibility, it does 
not successfully establish the incompatibility between causal determinism 
and moral responsibility. It merely poses another problem in the case of 
overdetermination. 
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Be that as it may, I do not agree with Fischer on this point. I do 
not think it is a clever idea to extend the scope of moral responsibility 
to the consequence-universal, but should instead, limit itself to the 
consequence-particular. 
At first, when Fischer argued the case of omission he stated on 
the second condition of the complex omission that “the relevant event in 
the external world is suitably sensitive to his failure to move his body in 
a different way”. The relevant event, in my opinion, is the consequence-
universal. Thus, it is appropriate to understand that consequence-universal 
is within the scope of moral responsibility’s condition for Fischer. This 
condition has been confirmed again when Fischer argued against Mckenna 
by using his overdetermination approach. 
I argue that moral responsibility should solely focus on the 
consequence-particular issuing from the moderate-reason responsiveness 
mechanism. There are two main reasons that motivate me.  Firstly, 
it is possible to say that the consequence-universal is not always a 
direct consequence of the action issuing from the moderate reason-
responsiveness mechanism. As in the example of glacier, the consequence-
universal obtained from the natural disaster along with Betty’s action. 
The consequence-universal is not stable, because it can issue from natural 
phenomena and another people’s intentions. While the consequence-
particular can be either good or bad and the consequence-universal can 
also be either good or bad, the consequence-particular always follows 
directly from the moderate-reasons responsiveness. The consequence-
universal, on the other hands, could be responsive to the consequence-
particular but it can also follow from something else such as a natural 
disaster.  Secondly, when compatibilist (or semi-compatibilist) agrees 
that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism without 
regard to the causal chain “prior” to the agent’s deliberation process, why 
should we consider the chain that comes “after” the agent’s action? The 
fact that the agent “chooses” and “acts” is already sufficient to consider 
him to be morally responsible for his action. 
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Nonetheless, it is possible that the agent does not deliberate about 
the issue and trigger his action, but is responsible for the consequence-
universal. But this responsibility is not morally responsible in the sense of 
“intentionally”. Thus, it is appropriate to say that the agent is “partially” 
responsible for the consequence-universal in the sense that he does not 
mean it to happen. For instance, I plan to kill a person by shooting at 
him. Unbeknown to my knowledge, another person is walking past the 
bullet’s trajectory and is shot.
Conclusion
I believe that moral responsibility should concern merely these 
two main aspects: intention and action which is issuing directly from the 
intention. In Fischer terms, it means the action responsive to the moderate 
reason-responsiveness mechanism. The motivation to limit merely on 
intention and action since it is not always the case that consequence-
universal would be a direct result from action issuing directly from the 
mechanism as it appears on the case of overdetermination. 
By grasping this standpoint, I am acknowledging that the thesis of 
causal determinism and the consequence argument are both true. Be that 
as it may, these acknowledgments do not mean that moral responsibility 
could not happen within the causal chain. Moderate reason-responsiveness 
mechanism and guidance control are adequate to be considered conditions 
for moral responsibility within the chain of causal determinism. They 
help us to locate the starting point to inquire from where does the action 
originate. The action itself, is within the causal chain of determinism. 
Nevertheless, we should confine the subject of who ought to be in 
charge of the outcome merely to the action resulting from the mechanism. 
If we ignore the chain prior to the agent, for what reason should we 
accept the following chain from the agent, especially the chain that 
allows something else to happen rather than the agent’s original intention? 
Where will it be halted? Truly, I trust that we should be in charge of our 
original intention and the following action we resolved to do, on the 
grounds that we believe it is within our power to do. In other words, the 
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action that receptive to our intention. Unfortunately, consequence of an 
action is not always corresponding to its original intention and action. 
It possibly includes numerous factors, such as the natural law and other 
people endeavors. It is conceivable to claim partially moral responsible 
for the consequence-universal. In any case, it is not completely accredited 
solely to the agent’s action. 
I trust that Fischer should be a little more concerned with the 
epistemic status of the agent. In all of Frankfurt’s example, the there is 
always something ‘unbeknown’ to the agent. This ‘unknown’ condition 
is not taking into account the agent’s deliberation process. In this way, 
the agent believes that it is within his power to perform something 
different.  He neglects to perform what he considers to be the best among 
his alternatives or at least he believes that it is his best option at the time. 
Therefore, I believe that an agent is morally responsible for the action that 
he believes he has potential to bring about, the action that is required for 
the desired result. We should restrict our moral judgments merely to these 
conditions and there is no need to extend the conditions to something, 
which might not belong to the agent.  
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